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Abstract
This study investigates the tax aggressiveness in politically connected companies.
Based on the relation-based system, politically connected companies tend to be
more tax aggressiveness due to its benefit of being a tax aggressiveness. Using 625
companies-years observations, we reveal that politically connected companies listed
in Indonesia Stock Exchange are likely to be more aggressive in tax. Applying the
independent t test, however, there is no significant difference between politically
connected companies and non-connected companies. The finding also indicate that
the profitability is higher for politically connected companies rather than non-connected.
Contract to profitability, politically connected companies’ leverage is lower than non-
connected. This study has theoretical and practical implications and they discuss in
detail in this article.
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1. Background of the Study
The term of tax aggressiveness often refers to the tax avoidance (Hanlon & Shane,
2010) and it is part of tax planning. Tax aggressiveness is viewed as a activity of value
maximization that shifts the wealth from the state to the company shareholders (Kim, Li,
& Zhang, 2011). Definition of Tax aggressiveness has been provided by many experts.
For example, (Hanlon & Shane, 2010) provide us with definition of tax aggressiveness as
behavior of tax planning that being at more aggressiveness end of the description. Man-
agerial decisions were planned merely to keep down corporate taxes through activities
of tax aggressiveness (Lanis & Richardson, 2011). However, corporate tax aggressiveness
carry the significant disadvantage andmerits for society, management, and stockholders
(Lanis & Richardson, 2011). The primary benefit of tax aggressiveness make company’s
sharesmore attractive and positive news to the capital market (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009).
How to cite this article: Zaitul and Desi Ilona, (2019), “Tax Aggressiveness and Politically Connected Company” in Social Sciences on Sustainable
Development for World Challenge: The First Economics, Law, Education and Humanities International Conference, KnE Social Sciences, pages
10–19. DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i14.4294
Page 10
Received: 18 January 2019
Accepted: 24 March 2019
Published: 31 March 2019
Publishing services provided by
Knowledge E
Zaitul and Desi Ilona. This
article is distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use and
redistribution provided that the
original author and source are
credited.
Selection and Peer-review under
the responsibility of the First
ELEHIC Conference Committee.
The First ELEHIC
However, (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) add that the disadvantage of tax aggressiveness
are the potential for tax fine and penalties, implementation cost, reputational cost, and
political cost. Corporate tax aggressiveness may generate agency problems due to the
unaligned interest of managers and stockholders regarding to tax risk (Wahab, Ariff,
Marzuki, & Sanusi, 2017). Further, (Wahab et al., 2017) argue that the stockholders want
manager or directors will take actions on benefit of them and one way to do it is by
focusing on profit maximatition through reducing the tax liabilities.
There are a bundle of previous studies on corporate tax aggressiveness (Adhikari,
Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010; Hanlon & Slemrod,
2009; Kim & Zhang, 2016; Lanis & Richardson, 2011, 2012; Richardson, Taylor, & Lanis,
2016; Sánchez-Marín, Portillo-Navarro, & Clavel, 2016; Wahab et al., 2017; Yuan, McIver,
& Burrow, 2012). (Adhikari et al., 2006) examine the relationship between effective tax
rates and political connections in developing economies (Malaysia) and conclude that
politically connected companies pay tax at significantly lower effective rates (more tax
aggresiveness) compared to other company. Moreever, (Chen et al., 2010) investigate
the tax aggressiveness between family and non-family company and found that family
companies are less tax aggressiveness compared to non-family companies. Further,
(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) carry out a study of stock price reaction to news about cor-
porate tax aggressiveness and conclude that a company’s stock price declines when
there is news about its involvement in tax shelters. Thereafter, (Kim & Zhang, 2016)
investigate the relationship between political connected companies and tax aggres-
siveness using U.S companies and conclude that the politically connected companies
are more tax aggressiveness than no connected companies. Thus, (Lanis & Richardson,
2012a) examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate
tax aggressiveness using 408 Australian listed companies and found that more socially
responsible companies are likely to be less tax aggressiveness. In addition, (Richardson
et al., 2016) investigate the effect of women on Board of Directors on corporate tax
aggressiveness using the Australia’s companies and found that women on Board is likely
to reduce the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. (Sánchez-Marín et al., 2016) analyses the
tax aggressiveness among family firms and conclude that family ownership influence
the tax aggressiveness in different ways. (Wahab et al., 2017) examine the relationship
between politically connected companies and tax aggressiveness in Malaysia and con-
clude that politically connected companies are more tax aggressiveness. Finally, (Yuan
et al., 2012) investigate the tax aggressiveness post new Enterprise Income Tax Law and
found that corporate tax aggressiveness has reduced as a result of the 2008 Enterprise
Income Tax reform.
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Based on previous research above, the studies investigate the tax aggressiveness in
politically connected companies are still limited (Adhikari et al., 2006; C. Kim & Zhang,
2016; Wahab et al., 2017). (Wahab et al., 2017) argue that there is limited evidence in
how the level of tax aggressiveness in politically connected companies, especially in
Malaysia. All three studies were conducted in Anglo Saxon countries (Malaysia and
US). Therefore, there is lack of such studies conducted in Continental Europe coun-
ties, such as Indonesia. Even though, there are few studies investigating the politically
connected companies in Indonesia, the studies focused on audit report lag and loan
interest rate (Habib & Muhammadi, 2018; Harymawan, 2017). In addition, study investi-
gating the tax aggressiveness using Indonesia’s data has been done (see for example,
Prawira, 2017) but not grouped companies into politically connected companies and non
connected companies. Therefore, this study examines the tax aggressiveness between
politically connected companies and non-connected companies using Indonesia’s com-
panies. Thus, this study could enrich the literature of tax aggressiveness and politi-
cally connected companies because it is conducted in unique business environment.
Indonesia business environment is characterized by two-tiers Board system (Darmadi,
2013; Zaitul & Ilona, 2018), largest economy in Southeast Asia and the 16th-largest in
the world (Darmadi, 2016). Indonesia is also categorized as weak corporate governance
external mechanism, such as low investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 1999). This study aims to determine any difference of tax aggressiveness and
company’s characteristics between politically connected companies and non-connected
companies. Beside, this study also determines whether politically connected companies
more tax aggressiveness. This paper is organized as follow: the first session discusses
about background of the study. The second session is about theoretical aspect and
followed by methodology in the third session. Fourth session discuss the result and
discussion and finally the conclusion and recommendation session in the fifth session.
2. Tax Aggresiveness and Politically
Connected Companies
Tax aggressiveness may be favoured by investors where it transfers value from the gov-
ernment to the firm and it advance shareholder’s interests (Desai & Dharmapala 2009).
However, this value transfer may be twisted and create the agency problems (Desai &
Dharmapala, 2009). (Yuan et al., 2012) argue that based on the agency framework, the
activity of tax aggresiveness may yield from a stimulus for managers to make use of the
tax function to release private rents and upgrade their personal utility at the damage of
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stockholders’ interest. In fact, (Wahab et al., 2017) support (Yuan et al., 2012)’s contention
and state that it can lead to corporate tax decision that reflect private interests of the
directors rather than the stockholders. Therefore, there is a need to run the corporate
governance mechanism to reduce the agency problem. For example, (Yuan et al., 2012)
suggest that it is neccessary to make stronger the external and internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms. (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) argue that tax aggresiveness may have
a positive and negative impact on company value. If this activities could reduce the
tax liabilities, it would become a positive news to the market. However, comporate tax
aggresiveness is deemed by Internal Revenues Service (IRS) and the tax courts to be
noncomplience, it creates a negative news to the market. This condition bring company
to be labelled as “poor corporate citizen”(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009).
The previous evidence of tax aggresiveness in politcally connected companies show
that politically connected companies are likely to be more tax aggresiveness (Adhikari
et al., 2006; Kim & Zhang, 2016; Wahab et al., 2017). (Adhikari et al., 2006) argue that the
reason why polically connected companies tends to be more tax aggresiveness is that
Malaysia government uderpine selected companies for overlapping policy and personal
reasons. Further, there is significant differences between companies of developing (i.e.,
relationship-based) capitilism and companies of developed (i.e., market-based) capital-
ism (Adhikari et al., 2006). In addition, (Kim & Zhang, 2016) conclude that more tax aggre-
siveness of politically connected companies in US due to better information regarding
tax regulation and enforcement, lower detection risk, lower political costs of aggresive
tax planning, lower capital market pressure for transparancy, and greater risk-taking
tendencies. (Wahab et al., 2017) validate the finding of (Adhikari et al., 2006), who argue
that overlapping policy between public and personal dimensions of political connections
encourage the good turn served to connected companies in the fashion of corporate
tax relief and possible tax–free bailouts. A relationship-based system is used by East
Asian countries and it brings about a self-governing system of imminent connection
among government, banks, politicians and other stakeholders (Rajan & Zingales, 1998).
Based on the system used in Indonesia, it may be expected that politically connected
companies of Indonesia tends to be more tax aggresive compared to non connected
companies. Therefore, the hypothesis is developed as follow.
H1: Politically connected companies in Indonesia is likely to be more tax
aggresive compared to non connected companies
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3. Methodlogy
To test the hypothesis, this study use the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia
Stock Exchange (IDX). the final sample of this study is 125 companies or 625 companies-
years observation. Data were collected from financial reports which gathered through
IDX website. Politically connected companies were identified by see the name of com-
pany which followed by Persero. Tax aggressiveness is measured by cash ETR (Minnick
& Noga, 2010) and which defined as cash tax paid divided by pre-tax book income
before special items (Dyreng, Hanlon, &Maydew, 2010). Besides, this study also uses the
profitability and leverage. Profitability is measured by Return on Asset (ROA) (Carpenter
& Fredrickson, 2001; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Haleblian & Finikelstein, 1993;
Jackling & Johl, 2009). Level of leverage indicate the agency problems in term of mon-
itoring cost and how companies choose to finance the operations (Hutchinson & Gul,
2004). In addition, leverage is measured by ratio of total debt to total assets (Erickson,
Park, Reising, & Shin, 2005; Foong & Idris, 2012; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Short & Keasey,
1999). Independent t test is used to see any difference in means between politically
connected companies and non-connected companies (Wahab et al., 2017).
4. Result and Discussion
As mention above, this study aims to investigate whether politically connected com-
panies is more tax aggressive compared to non-connected companies. Using 625
company-years observation, themeans, standard deviation, minimal andmaximal values
are demonstrated in Table 1. Means value of tax aggressiveness is 0.23 which is lower
than finding of (Dyreng et al., 2010). Thus, it implies that Indonesia companies is more tax
aggressiveness. Regarding to company’s ability to earn the profit (profitability), average
value of company profitability is 5.52% with minimal and maximal value are -55% and
260% respectively. In addition, leverage means value is 52.77% which imply that 0.5277
of assets are financed by debt and the rest is funded by equities.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables.
Mean Std Min Max
Panel A. Corporate TA
Tax Aggressiveness 0.23 0.71 -7.68 5.8
Panel B. Company’s
Characteristics
Profitability 5.52 15.21 -55 260
Leverage 52.77 46.36 -56 506
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Table 2 show the means and means difference between politically connected com-
panies and non-connected companies. Means value of tax aggressiveness for politically
connected companies (0.21) is lower compared to non-connected companies (0.23). this
finding imply that politically connected companies is more tax aggressiveness com-
pared to non-connected companies. This findings confirm the finding of previous stud-
ies (Adhikari et al., 2006; C. Kim & Zhang, 2016; Wahab et al., 2017) which conclude
that politically connected companies are more tax aggressiveness. However, the means
difference is not significant at 5%.
Table 2: Means and Means difference Polcon vs. Non Connected.
Polcon Non-Polcon Means difference
Panel A. Corporate TA
Tax Aggressiveness 0.21 0.23 -0.02(-0.13)
Panel B. Company’s
Characteristics
Profitability 6.27 5.48 0.01(0.52)
Leverage 38.79 53.35 -0.15(-1.54)
Further, the means value of profitability is higher for politically connected companies
(6.27%) rather than non-connected companies (5.48%). There is possible explanation for
higher profitability of politically connected companies. Politically connected companies
tend to have a better information regarding tax regulation and enforcement, lower polit-
ical cost, and lower capital market pressure for transparency (C. Kim & Zhang, 2016). All
above benefits will create the good profitability position. For example, better information
will yield low tax cost and therefore increase the net income and finally result higher
return on asset. However, the difference is not significant. Further, leverage is lower
for politically connected companies (38.79%) compared to non-connected companies
(53.35%). This result may be explained by fact that politically connected companies has a
limited capabilities to expand (Wahab, Zain, & Rahman, 2015). In this context, Indonesia’s
political connection companies fail to take advantage of taking debt as main sources
of fund to finance the company’s asset. The study periods (2012-2016) is a period of
better economic condition which characterized by low interest rate, including low cost of
debt. Well-managed companies would take this opportunity to expand by using the debt
capital to finance the expanding activities. However, politically connected companies fail
to do so.
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5. Conclusion and Recommendation
Tax aggressiveness among politically connected companies have been attracting an
academics and practitioners recently. Politically connected companies are likely to be
more tax aggressiveness in US and Malaysia. However, tax aggressiveness of politi-
cally connected companies are unknown in Indonesia. In addition, it is expected that
politically connected companies in Indonesia tend to more tax aggressiveness as well.
Usingmanufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange, it can be concluded
that tax aggressiveness of politically connected companies are more tax aggressive-
ness compared to non-connected companies. However, the means difference is not
significant at 5%. Besides, this study also reveals that profitability is higher for polit-
ically connected companies. However, the company leverage is lower for politically
connected companies. This study has theoretical and practical implication. Theoretically,
this study contributes to political economy discipline in the sense that by design, there is
a transfer of wealth from the state to shareholders. Relation-based economy creates the
opportunities for politically connected companies to reduce the tax liabilities due to hav-
ing a better information, and lower political cost of aggressive tax planning. Practically,
politically connected companies should not gain the competitive advantage through
relation-based economy because this relation-based economy is temporary. A number
of important limitations need to be considered. First, this study is descriptive in nature.
Second, this article uses one sector (manufacturing sector). Finally, this paper only uses
three variables. Therefore, it is recommended that further research be undertaken in
the following areas. First, future researcher can advance this study by testing the effect
of politically connected companies on tax aggressiveness. Second, next research can
emphasize by adding more sector as research object, such as main sector, or service
and trading sector. Finally, next analysis also can be done by adding other variables,
such as corporate governance concepts.
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